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a reflection philosophy, and if it is supported by valid, logical thinking, it is 
usually reflected in the scientific dissertations that are propagated in discussions 
or publications. Sometimes it has a considerable impact on the views, actions, 
deeds and lives of many communities. The history of mankind confirms that 
Philosophy is the love of wisdom. It would be great if everyone could say so.  
On the prewar syllabus for the second form of high school there was a subject 
named Introduction to philosophy. There was an excellent textbook that was of a 
great help to teachers. Along with the new political system, the obligation to 
think logically and to drill the principles of logical thinking into the young 
generation vanished. The effects of the lack of proper thinking and inability to 
draw conclusions are very unpleasant for society. One can see and feel that. It 
has been suggested recently that junior academics or even senior researchers of 
the philosophy departments give lectures on philosophical subjects in secondary 
schools.  
Maybe it would bring a chance to change something? 
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TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI
– A PHILOSOPHER AND A TEACHER
The 70th anniversary of our university is an excellent occasion to reminisce 
about Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who – and few can still remember that – was the 
first rector of this institution. He performed this function in the difficult post-war 
years of 1945–1949. He organised, together with a group of his associates, 
a higher education facility in a city that had never had this kind of scientific 
research and didactic institution. They acted in a period when the traumas of 
occupation and war were still alive, in a time difficult not only due to political 
and social issues, but also because people suffered from the lack of basic 
elements necessary for everyday existence. 
Despite all this, the University functioned more and more efficiently and among 
the many newly created study courses you could find philosophy, resurrected, 
you could say, after the war hiatus. Professor Kotarbiński assembled around him 
a rather numerous group of scholars, survivors from the ravages of war, and 
started to present the ideas which were formulated and developed – to a great 
extent thanks to him – at Polish universities, especially the University of 
Warsaw, where he taught in the years 1919–1939. He proved himself to be an 
outstanding lecturer. He gathered a big circle of students, among whom you can 
find names known not only in Poland.  
Professor Kotarbiński not only belonged to a community of scholars but he also 
cofounded it. It was a community which took place in the books on the history 
of philosophy as the Lvov–Warsaw School. In that school – started by Kazi- 
mierz Twardowski in Lvov and famous for names like Stanisław Leśniewski, 
Jan Łukasiewicz, Alfred Tarski or Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz – Tadeusz Ko-
tarbiński played a distinctive role. While those mentioned concentrated in their 
research mostly on formal logic, he put special emphasis on teaching logic 
together with the theory of language (semantics) and methodology of science  
– due to the character and scope of his interest as a philosopher.
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What did Kotarbiński have in mind when he thought philosophy’? “Philosophy 
is to be understood”, we can read in one of his most important works, “as 
investigation of things about which science has not – so far or fundamentally 
– expressed its opinion, and things about which a sapient man wants to have
some reasonable ideas that could be tied together into a uniform opinion about 
the world”.1 It is then, generally speaking, a system of convictions characterised 
by a global approach to reality, complemented by the still discussed issue of 
recommendations regarding moral acts. 
What we are dealing with here is a general declaration showing the basis of 
a system of ideas and convictions which are of fundamental importance to 
a person willing to live their lives in accordance with reason and dignity. In their 
contents, those ideas and convictions clearly go beyond what was considered to 
be the procedures and results of actions that were supposed to show the way 
to science, understood in the way that became so popular when the author of the 
mentioned piece developed his views as a philosopher. 
As a result, the question of the mutual relationship between philosophy and 
science deserves a special highlight because of the idea that was more and more 
widespread in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, an 
idea which claimed that with the advancement of science, especially the natural 
sciences, matters which were traditionally considered to be philosophical were 
being reduced or, in a more extreme case, eliminated completely. Such ideas 
were presented by supporters of the school of thought commonly called 
positivism, popular in Western Europe. The strongest formulations of that 
opinion came from the representatives of the Vienna Circle.  
Tadeusz Kotarbiński was of a different opinion. The longevity of ideas histori-
cally proposed by philosophers suggests that a person cannot give up looking for 
answers to which science provides no answers. They are also aware that the 
historical record that a modern person has access to is characterised by 
a multitude of viewpoints and ideas bearing witness to how limited their 
knowledge is about the world and about themselves. That record includes some 
beliefs about reality which today raise doubts, beliefs which were considered 
true by thinkers of the past but which today are plainly false yet are still presented
as true to the public in the language of philosophical discourse. A good example 
of such attempts is the spread of religious ideas in the form of philosophical 
discourse. 
A task presented to a representative for philosophy, which did go beyond the 
scientific horizon, but tried to be completely consistent with it – and such was 
the programme of the school that Kotarbiński was a member of – was all about 
conducting a critical analysis of those philosophical formulas. That critical 
1 KOTARBIŃSKI [1961].
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analysis was to be a procedure which could realise the call for an analytical 
deconstruction of the language of such philosophical discourse and which could 
result in uncovering the meaning hidden under “heaps of rubble” which had 
piled up throughout centuries of philosophical investigations.2
In contrast to natural scientists, philosophers do not have at their disposal the 
instruments that allow them to penetrate the subject of their investigation 
through, e.g. experimental procedures. They can only observe reality and 
express the results of those observations in language. Language constitutes the 
only instrument through which a philosopher can mediate the results of that 
analysis of reality. That is why it is so important to see how it functions in 
philosophical discourse.  
Thus far, however, language as an isolated area of research had not been of 
special interest to many – which one can easily see when having a closer look at 
the history of philosophy. In modern philosophical thought that situation has 
changed drastically. There were two reasons for that shift of focus towards 
language among scholars in modern times, it seems: first of all, it was due to the 
dissatisfaction with its previous forms of expression in philosophy as shown by 
its lack of precision in formulating claims, its ambiguities and even formulating 
ideas which, on closer inspection, were nonsensical. The second reason was 
connected with the increasing scepticism created by the advancement of applied 
methods in natural sciences regarding the possibility of ever reaching in 
a cognitive act any extrasensory reality, reaching an ontological system existing 
independently in a form beyond an act of sensory perception. 
Tadeusz Kotarbiński did not share the views of those radical sceptics. He was of 
the opinion that a cognitive act should not be limited to perception of phenome-
na, and that the claim suggesting that nothing exists beyond them is unwarranted. 
He was convinced that a cognitive act refers to real entities, actually existing 
beyond human awareness. Moreover, he believed that those entities are indeed 
individual corporeal objects which included human existences. 
For that reason, he declared an ontological position he called reism, concretism 
or somatism.3 By rejecting the existence of individual immaterial entities 
– as often happened in the case of earlier thinkers – he presented himself as
a materialist. That radically concretistic and materialistic ontology was – as he 
himself admits – a result of his relfection on language as a tool for describing 
experiences. It turned out that, when closely scrutinised, not only common ways 
of talking but the whole of language is a deceptive tool for describing reality. 
For example, general expressions used in sentences suggest that their meaning 
refers to entities characterised by that generality.  
2 See KOTARBIŃSKI [1958], paper: “Kultura filozoficzna”.   
3 See KOTARBIŃSKI [1958], paper: “O postawie reistycznej, czyli konkrety stycznej”.
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Such a position was, as we know, presented by Plato. Hence, the idea that apart 
from individual objects there exist general entities (unviersals) is called Plato-
nism. What’s more, a common way of talking may suggest that states of things, 
changes and relations exist independently of individual objects. For example, the 
phrase “extensibility characterises all bodies” suggests that this extensibility can 
exist as an entity independent of those bodies.  
It may be worth mentioning that this radical “concretistic” approach of Ko-
tarbiński came under attack especially from mathematicians. With time, he 
decided not to defend it to the letter claiming the he would keep it just as 
a programme.4 When it comes to the semantic sphere of his idea, regarding the 
way we should speak about the results of cognitive acts with any sense, he 
remained true to his beliefs. 
Another area of philosophical investigation of Professor Kotarbiński was ethics. 
His considerations about such an important – and still present in his biography 
– reflection about good and evil started very early in his life and he considered
them to be the most important part of the system of beliefs he was developing.5
We say that because we are dealing here with a sketch of a system and those 
who treat reism, the ethics of a reliable guardian, and praxeology as not connected 
in any way are simply wrong.  
The core of Kotarbiński’s system is the human being. Human beings are 
thinking and active, which means that they learn about the world and, at the 
same time, through their rational actions shape the area they inhabit as social 
beings. These are the forms of socialisation historically shaped by them and 
forms of spiritual culture associated with them. To act in such a way, you need 
not only the knowledge about the object of such actions but also a system of 
values which will not only guide them but also create a special kind of relation-
ship between agents. 
That action, taken consciously on the basis of the known state of things and 
intended goals, has two basic forms. The first form is a system of values which 
a human being acquires in the process of historic self-education, while the other 
is connected with purely practical actions in a technical sense. It’s about actions 
whose result is to form the surroundings in such a way that they take the best 
shape for meeting people’s basic needs. This area of human activity is a separate 
subject of interest for the Philosopher and takes the form of a theoretical concept 
about human actions which he called praxeology.  
When it comes to ethics, Tadeusz Kotarbiński opposes both the traditionalists, 
who refer to transcendental ideas for moral guidance, and the proponents of 
4 See KOTARBIŃSKI [1961], and his “Fazy rozwojowe konkretyzmu”.
5 See MAŁACHOWSKI [1972], p. 4. 
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more modern ideas, who support radical naturalism rooted in Darwinism. Since 
the very beginning of his creative career, Kotarbiński critically deconstructed the 
ethical ideas of Spencer and Mill. He also thought that eudemonism suggested 
by some ancient philosophers was unacceptable. The professor preferred the 
ethics of the Gospel, with its idea of goodness and sacrifice.6 The main goal 
there is to help a fellow creature in need and not to seek your own individual 
happiness. A person willing to live with dignity should be characterised by 
prudence, intellectual maturity, which makes it possible to learn the true state of 
things in relationships between people. They should be characterised by courage 
in situations when it is necessary to defend anyone in danger of suffering or 
being harmed; they are obliged to keep their word and be able to act in critical 
situations against their interest. It is a kind of ethics, then, which demands that 
one’s beliefs are followed by their corresponding actions.
The author of that moral programme believed that humans, as rational beings, 
are able to distinguish between good and evil without needing to refer to any 
commands or suggestions allegedly coming from outside the domain of experi-
ence. In that sense, we are dealing here with a system of ethics independent of 
those commands or suggestions, one in which a human is their own lawmaker. 
The moral system thusly understood cannot be threatened by any loss of faith in 
the transcendental. 
The rational approach to the question of morality brings to mind a sort of 
minimalism, best presented in the famous formula of reliable guardianship.7 The 
superior virtue here is not the happiness of an individual but helping any fellow 
being threatened by suffering or harm. Kotarbiński – a realist and a proponent of 
prudence and moderation – considered the maximalistic programmes of univer-
sal happiness of humankind as utopian phantasies. 
Another early interest of Professor Kotarbiński was the question of practical 
actions of a person trying to achieve a desired result. He published a comprehen-
sive treatise Szkice praktyczne (Practical drafts) as early as in 1913. He came 
back to this topic many times, but it wasn’t until after World War II that he made 
the effort to present in detail the issues of the so-called praxeology. It is worth 
noting that Traktat o dobrej robocie (A Treatise on Good Work), the work 
devoted to the topic, published in 1955 under the aegis of Łódzkie Towarzystwo 
Naukowe, was created for the most part during the time its author was the rector 
of our University. 
It is difficult to present here in much detail the ideas described in the treatise. 
Broadly speaking, the author wanted to develop a general theory of action 
because he believed that the practical activity of a thinking being is an important 
6 See KOTARBIŃSKI [1957] and the paper “O tak zwanej miłości bliźniego”.
7 See WOLEŃSKI [1990], p. 137.
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element of human existence. In this regard, praxeology must be recognised as an 
important element of the construct of the systemic philosophy of man that 
Kotarbiński created.
Thus, a separate scientific discipline was founded, one that laid the foundations 
for any analyses of human practical activities. The publication of the mentioned 
Treatise inspired the work of scholars who found the ideas presented there 
appealing. Scientific research facilities were created together with a scientific 
society, bringing together scholars interested in praxeology. It also gave 
a theoretical basis to the thriving research on the organisation of work, collabo-
ration and the cooperation of multidisciplinary production groups.  
That is the shortest possible summary of the philosophical ideas of Tadeusz 
Kotarbiński. His image, however, would be incomplete if we said nothing about 
his educational work.  
Kotarbiński began teaching in 1912 in the Mikołaj Rej High School in Warsaw, 
where he taught Latin and Greek. From 1919 until the beginning of the World 
War II he taught logic and methodology of science to students of University of 
Warsaw. He continued his educational work throughout the time of occupation 
and after the war until he retired. His almost 25-year-long educational career 
bore fruit in the form of numerous groups of students, many of whom were later 
recognised as excellent philosophers. His educational excellence is proven by 
the fact that his students published out of gratitude no fewer than three com-
memorative books devoted to his work.  
An important complement of Professor Kotarbiński’s educational work was 
numerous publications on teaching philosophy, didactics and course books.  
Undoubtedly the most important among them was a comprehensive study on the 
theory of cognition, logic and methodology of science called Elements. This 
work was treated by its author as an instrument of didactics, just a course book, 
but the ideas and concepts presented there, as well as its public reception and the 
number of languages it has been translated into, suggest that it’s more than that. 
Elements of the Theory of Cognition, Formal Logic and Methodology of Science 
is undoubtedly Kotarbiński’s opus magnum, a treatise presenting the important 
contents of his philosophical ideas. 
This work, published for the first time in 1927, is complemented by, among 
lesser treatises on didactics, Lectures from the history of Logic. That book, 
published in 1957, comprised lectures for philosophy students at the University 
of Warsaw that Kotarbiński gave in the years 1952–1957. Anyone who studied 
law at the University of Łódź in the post-war years, as well as later philosophy 
students, should remember A course of logic for lawyers. It goes without saying 
that those didactic publications are characterised by accessibility, clarity and 
richness of information about the subject they refer to.  
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At the end, let us try and answer the question of who Tadeusz Kotarbiński was 
as a teacher and a person whom not many of those still alive had the chance to 
meet. He treated his educational work as his civic duty, consisting in not only 
educational competence, reliability and clarity of thought, but also in developing 
in his students the characteristics and virtues he encapsulated in his idea of 
a man – honest, open to others, righteous and helpful in difficult situations. In 
his life he realised the ethos of the reliable guardian. I say that with deep 
conviction because I myself experienced not only his kindness, but also his help 
in situations that were difficult for me. 
When it comes to social issues, he was a moderate realist. He distanced himself 
from the utopian visions and phantasies of the supporters of radical social 
revolution. He believed that through honest and just work, cooperation between 
people able to put a common good over their individual interests, one could 
build a social order in which the previous aches and pains of everyday life 
could be significantly reduced.  
In the pre-war times he was critical of the social and political relations. He 
especially actively opposed the process of limiting freedom in the system of 
education, the clericalisation of the public sphere and the nationalist group
running rampant in higher education facilities. After the war he actively joined 
the process of rebuilding the country by defending the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of discussion about social and political issues, which he voiced 
in articles printed in the press. 
Kotarbiński was worried about the ongoing process of imposing the official 
doctrine on society, which was, as a result becoming trivialised and intellectually 
degraded. He was treated rather agreeably by the political powers, especially in 
the period of relative liberalism of the first years after the war. It might be the 
reason why he was given the opportunity to take the position of the rector of 
University of Łódź.
The situation worsened after 1948. From that time he was treated stiffly; critical 
remarks about his philosophical views were raised and his educational work was 
limited to just teaching logic.  
The relative liberalisation of the social and political life that took place after the 
events of 1956 gave hope for a relaxation of civic liberties. It could be the reason 
why Kotarbiński was allowed to take the position of the president of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences which he held in the years 1957–1963. 
The illusions did not last long, however. The ongoing curtailment of intellectual 
liberties encouraged active defiance against the policy of the party. And so 
Tadeusz Kotarbiński soon joined protestive actions undertaken by the intellectu-
al opposition. He took part in discussions organised by a group of activists of 
Krzywe Koło, signed the famous “Letter of the 34”, and participated in political 
Ryszard Panasiuk 28
element of human existence. In this regard, praxeology must be recognised as an 
important element of the construct of the systemic philosophy of man that 
Kotarbiński created.
Thus, a separate scientific discipline was founded, one that laid the foundations 
for any analyses of human practical activities. The publication of the mentioned 
Treatise inspired the work of scholars who found the ideas presented there 
appealing. Scientific research facilities were created together with a scientific 
society, bringing together scholars interested in praxeology. It also gave 
a theoretical basis to the thriving research on the organisation of work, collabo-
ration and the cooperation of multidisciplinary production groups.  
That is the shortest possible summary of the philosophical ideas of Tadeusz 
Kotarbiński. His image, however, would be incomplete if we said nothing about 
his educational work.  
Kotarbiński began teaching in 1912 in the Mikołaj Rej High School in Warsaw, 
where he taught Latin and Greek. From 1919 until the beginning of the World 
War II he taught logic and methodology of science to students of University of 
Warsaw. He continued his educational work throughout the time of occupation 
and after the war until he retired. His almost 25-year-long educational career 
bore fruit in the form of numerous groups of students, many of whom were later 
recognised as excellent philosophers. His educational excellence is proven by 
the fact that his students published out of gratitude no fewer than three com-
memorative books devoted to his work.  
An important complement of Professor Kotarbiński’s educational work was 
numerous publications on teaching philosophy, didactics and course books.  
Undoubtedly the most important among them was a comprehensive study on the 
theory of cognition, logic and methodology of science called Elements. This 
work was treated by its author as an instrument of didactics, just a course book, 
but the ideas and concepts presented there, as well as its public reception and the 
number of languages it has been translated into, suggest that it’s more than that. 
Elements of the Theory of Cognition, Formal Logic and Methodology of Science 
is undoubtedly Kotarbiński’s opus magnum, a treatise presenting the important 
contents of his philosophical ideas. 
This work, published for the first time in 1927, is complemented by, among 
lesser treatises on didactics, Lectures from the history of Logic. That book, 
published in 1957, comprised lectures for philosophy students at the University 
of Warsaw that Kotarbiński gave in the years 1952–1957. Anyone who studied 
law at the University of Łódź in the post-war years, as well as later philosophy 
students, should remember A course of logic for lawyers. It goes without saying 
that those didactic publications are characterised by accessibility, clarity and 
richness of information about the subject they refer to.  
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At the end, let us try and answer the question of who Tadeusz Kotarbiński was 
as a teacher and a person whom not many of those still alive had the chance to 
meet. He treated his educational work as his civic duty, consisting in not only 
educational competence, reliability and clarity of thought, but also in developing 
in his students the characteristics and virtues he encapsulated in his idea of 
a man – honest, open to others, righteous and helpful in difficult situations. In 
his life he realised the ethos of the reliable guardian. I say that with deep 
conviction because I myself experienced not only his kindness, but also his help 
in situations that were difficult for me. 
When it comes to social issues, he was a moderate realist. He distanced himself 
from the utopian visions and phantasies of the supporters of radical social 
revolution. He believed that through honest and just work, cooperation between 
people able to put a common good over their individual interests, one could 
build a social order in which the previous aches and pains of everyday life 
could be significantly reduced.  
In the pre-war times he was critical of the social and political relations. He 
especially actively opposed the process of limiting freedom in the system of 
education, the clericalisation of the public sphere and the nationalist group
running rampant in higher education facilities. After the war he actively joined 
the process of rebuilding the country by defending the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of discussion about social and political issues, which he voiced 
in articles printed in the press. 
Kotarbiński was worried about the ongoing process of imposing the official 
doctrine on society, which was, as a result becoming trivialised and intellectually 
degraded. He was treated rather agreeably by the political powers, especially in 
the period of relative liberalism of the first years after the war. It might be the 
reason why he was given the opportunity to take the position of the rector of 
University of Łódź.
The situation worsened after 1948. From that time he was treated stiffly; critical 
remarks about his philosophical views were raised and his educational work was 
limited to just teaching logic.  
The relative liberalisation of the social and political life that took place after the 
events of 1956 gave hope for a relaxation of civic liberties. It could be the reason 
why Kotarbiński was allowed to take the position of the president of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences which he held in the years 1957–1963. 
The illusions did not last long, however. The ongoing curtailment of intellectual 
liberties encouraged active defiance against the policy of the party. And so 
Tadeusz Kotarbiński soon joined protestive actions undertaken by the intellectu-
al opposition. He took part in discussions organised by a group of activists of 
Krzywe Koło, signed the famous “Letter of the 34”, and participated in political 
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processes as a protester against tendentious accusations. He strongly condemned 
the government for suppressing intellectual liberty in 1968 and especially the 
anti-Semitic background tone of its aggressive propaganda. He resigned from 
presiding over the committee of the editorial staff of the Classics of Philosophy 
in protest against the firing of Irena Krońska, an honoured editor of that publish-
ing house. During one of the sessions of the Philosophy Committee he strongly 
condemned the expellment of scholars and students due to political and ethnic 
reasons. 
Professor Kotarbiński as a thinker and a propagator of his views, especially 
those regarding social issues, world view and politics, had many friends and 
supporters. But he also had enemies. It was true for the time between the wars, 
the time of occupation as well as the post-war era. It was during the occupation 
that his life was threatened, not only by the occupiers. It is not a coincidence that 
his long educational work did not grant him a commemorative place on the 
columns of the new library of University of Warsaw.  
Despite attempts to depreciate Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s scientific and educational 
legacy – some of which are made even nowadays – we can be truly proud of our 
first Rector. Let us not allow such an exquisite scientific legacy and such a high 
moral authority to be ever forgotten. 
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